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Executive Summary
Information technology (IT) is enabling; without the invention of useful appli-
cations it is of little value. Some of the most valuable applications are them-
selves remarkable inventions. This means that advances in IT shift the
invention-possibility frontier of the economy, permitting users of IT to invent
new and sometimes highly valuable applications, rather than directly shifting
the production-possibility frontier of the economy. IT is also general purpose
technology shared across a wide variety of uses. New advances in IT can there-
fore have an economy-wide impact, which will be larger or smaller according
to the degree of sharing. Finally, IT has the possibifity of substantial network ef-
fects. Together, these three features of IT mean that advances in it can have very
substantial impacts on long-run growth. The pace of arrival of that growth var-
ies across types of IT, however, according to the value of the enabled applica-
tions, the difficulty of the enabled invention (co-invention), the ease of sharing
advances, and the mechanisms for turning network effects into a force for ad-
vance rather than for inertia. These are complex forces, but analytical studies of
earlier IT advances suggest that there are two main patterns of the pace of up-
take. Current IT advances connected to the Internet seem highly likely to set off
both patterns as well, so that understanding the pace of aggregate value cre-
ation involves careful analysis of which pattern applies to what. So, too, does
policy formation to encourage widespread value creation.
I.Introduction
The welfare benefits of information technology (IT) are a subject of
much debate, with scholars and policy analysts attempting to under-
stand the relationship between IT innovation and productivity. Much
of this work neglects two of the most important features of IT in use,
neither of which is well captured by traditional models of the gains
from innovation. In the traditional model, new goods and services are
developed by vendors in response to perceived market demand or new136 Bresnahan
technological opportunities, and the value created by innovation arises
as users passively choose to buy the intrinsically valuable new technol-
ogies. In the context of IT, however, two key forces arise. First, IT does
not directly shift the production function of the firm that uses it. In-
stead, IT is an enabling technology that permits users to invent valu-
able new uses. This co-invention often involves investment in business
and organizational change by the users if the IT application is to be suc-
cessful.1 New IT technologies create value by shifting the inven-
tion-possibility frontier of the economy, setting off waves of valuable
co-invention. Second, the value of IT often depends on network effects,
in which the ultimate value to users of a technology depends on the
breadth of its use by other users and on the nature of other users' appli-
cations. The welfare benefits of IT are not a matter of bits and bytes and
baud rates, but rather of co-invention and coordination among users.
While most analyses of the "new economy" tend to assume that the
drivers of innovation are similar, there are actually two key types of IT
demand segments, each of which involves a distinct set of challenges
for firms and policymakers. In the first, new technologies potenially of-
fer tremendous benefits to using firms, but there are large co-invention
costs for these potential adopters. While the historical example of this
type of pattern is organizational computing, the Internet has created an
opportunity for interorganizational computing, in part explaining both
the tremendous promise and the slow start to e-commerce. In the sec-
ond type of demand segment, key technological advances yield little
value unless they are widely adopted. Once widespread adoption can
be achieved, however, large value to society follows, often without sub-
stantial co-invention costs. While the historical model for this is the
personal computer, the emerging example is mobile computing.
The general purpose technology (GPT) nature of IT invention and
co-invention promise large returns in the long run.2 Co-invention and
network effects are sources of substantial social increasing returns to
scale to IT. Partly this follows from external effects among users, and
partly it is because widespread use of the same IT in a number of differ-
ent uses creates a market opportunity for further invention and techni-
cal progress in IT itself. When the social increasing returns to scale to a
particular new IT technology are realized, we see economy-wide pro-
ductivity advances.3 Repeated and sustained exploitation of a sequence
of new IT technologies' social increasing returns implies sustained pro-
ductivity growth. My enquiry is into the pace of arrival of those
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that purpose, I review the main forces affecting the pace of adoption
and value creation in IT, look at how those forces have played out his-
torically in different segments of demand, then turn to the likely impli-
cations for the future and for policy formation.
II.Sources of Adoption Dynamics and Value
This section looks at the implications of network effects and co-inven-
tion for adoption dynamics and value creation.4 I first look at a specific
"technology" in the sense that engineers use the terma technology
such as web-enabled cell phones, instant messaging, or Java. The eco-
nomic returns to any particular technology are higher the more it is
used, and this induces an important (positive) feedback from wide-
spread usage to more rapid technical progress. This particular feed-
back loop can be anticipatory, as technologists will invent faster if there
is a larger market in the present or if they anticipate a larger market in
the future. Any of several market mechanisms can be behind this feed-
back, including monopoly and competition, each in several forms.5
Users of a particular IT technology sometimes gain network effects.
At a broad, abstract level this means that users benefit from having oth-
ers use the technology. More specifically, IT has network effectof two
kinds. First, it includes direct network effects, as when I can only call
you if both you and I have a telephone. Second, and perhapsslightly
unfamiliarly, it captures indirect network effects.6 These arise when
suppliers of content or applications respond to the number of users.
There must be indirect network effects among web-enabled cell-phone
users, for example, if more cell-phone-aware online content or online
applications would be available as a supply response to a larger num-
ber of users. Both the direct and indirect network effects are advan-
tages of widespread use, and the benefits of the network flow to both
early adopters and late adopters once both are using the technology.
While there is considerable controversy among observers about
some of the implications of network effects, there is widespread agree-
ment that successful exploitation of network effects is a source of con-
siderable value among users of IT.
Some IT applications are associated with substantial co-invention
costs. These are costs that a user needs to bear up front, before getting
any value out of the application. The co-invention costs include the
costs of programming to make a technology useful in a business infor-
mation system, the costs of training workers to use it, and, importantly,138 Bresnahan
the costs of inventing a business purpose for the system and organiza-
tional change to use it effectively. While not as familiar to economists,
co-invention costs are very substantial. If we look at the expenditures
that are made to invent IT and IT-based applications, only a small frac-
tion of the total cost lies in the IT-selling sectors of the economy.7
Look first at merely "technical" activities such as designing com-
puter hardware or writing computer software. When we count up all
the software that is written in connection with a single use, we find that
morefar moreof technical invention, on a cost basis, is done by
buyers than by sellers of IT. Much of that is applications design, appli-
cations maintenance, and systems maintenance activities. In the aggre-
gate, buyers of IT do somewhere between half an order of magnitude
and an order of magnitude more technical invention on a cost basis.8 If
we then look beyond the technical costs to the business costs, i.e., the
costs of inventing new uses for IT and new IT-based organizational
structures that can achieve those new uses, we find even more invest-
ment by buyers. Indeed, the costs of co-inventing the nontechnical
parts of applications appear to be, again by half an order of magnitude
to an order of magnitude, larger than the total costs of technical inven-
tion.9 The total cost of invention in IT in use can be divided into three
categories: most of it is the cost of business co-invention, the second
biggest category is technical co-invention, and the smallest category is
technical invention by the sellers of IT.
Since co-invention is risky, co-invention costs include costs of experi-
mentation, costs of failed systems, and so on. There is some learning
from experience, and from the experience of other users, so that co-
invention costs wifi sometimes be declining over time (when imitation
is cheaper than original co-invention). For example, current co-inven-
tion of XML-based business-to-business marketing and procurement
applications by early users of that technology may lead to valuable
learning that makes later imitation easier.
This imitation is itself a form of externality associated with increased
levels of usage, but notice that it is distinct from the network effects in
its timing. The network effects are symmetric in their timing: I can call
you and you me after we both have telephones; it doesn't matter who
adopted first. Imitation in co-invention is asymmetric: I can imitate
you, but not you me, if you first think of a new way to use IT in busi-
ness or a way to organize a firm or market to take advantage of IT.
These elements form the basic building blocks of my analysis of the
adoption cycle of a particular advance in information technologies. TheProspects for an Information-Technology-Led Productivity Surge 139
adoption cycle might take time because of three distinct bottlenecks
that arise in a single user's decision to adopt. The bottleneck to adop-
tion and value creation could be techno1ogy business co-invention, or
network effects.'° Once the user has adopted, value creation depends
not only on the level of technology, but also on the success of the co-
invention that has been enabled and on exploitation of network effects.
These Elements in Historically Important Technologies
To begin, let us look at the adoption of IT in commercial and business
uses in the past." The relative importance of network effects and ad-
justment costs has varied across the main segments of demand and ap-
plication. The segments are, in order of increasing complexity of the
business application, personal productivity applications (traditionally
supported by PCs), departmental computing (commercial minicom-
puters), organizational or enterprise computing (mainframes), and
primitive interorganizational computing (traditionally supported by
mainframes plus networking technologies such as EDT or SNA). Exam-
ples of these four segments might be typing a document in a word-
processing program, processing payroll in a regional office, using a
sales database to identify customers for new marketing efforts, and
capturing remote data from a sales terminal or an automatic teller ma-
chine.'2 In figure 4.1,1 show a continuum of IT applications, and the im-
portant ways that demand and adoption vary across them, with these
four segments highlighted.
The segments vary considerably in their adoption dynamics and
value creation mechanisms as a result of important differences in co-
invention and in network effects. Let me discuss some of the important
differences and revisit the figure to summarize those for analytical
purposes.
Adoption Dynamics with Individual Co-Invention Costs
On the right side of figure 4.1 are the organizational applications and
simple interorganizational applications. Historically, these segments
have had a high level of co-invention costs at the individual use level.
Here, the user is a firm or a firm plus a few key suppliers or customers
(such as travel agents in a simple interorganizational application like
the networks behind airline ticket sales automation). The main applica-
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cies. The underlying technologies used inthis areapowerful
computers, powerful data communications, and software to take ad-
vantage of themhave undergone constant and rapid technical prog-
ress.13 A successful application in this area can shift the production
function of the firm out considerably, but applications in turn call for
considerable co-invention.
A substantial management research literature, and a smaller econo-
metric one, have characterized the invention process in organizational
applications. The strongest finding from the management literature is
that co-invention is important, costly, time-consuming, and uncertain.
In new business information systems co-invention often takes the form
oflinkedimprovementsintheproductionprocessandin
difficult-to-measure "soft" output attributes. This co-invention in-
volves the translation of an underlying technical opportunity into busi-
ness systems which will produce an output using fewer resources
(sometimes) or a better output that customers might choose (often).
The translation is itself not trivial, nor is the conceptual leap of under-
standing how customers will value "soft" output attributes like timeli-
ness, convenience, flexibility and availability Second, new business
information systems oftencallfor changed organizations. Job
definitions, division or even firm boundaries, incentive schemes, and
other elements of the organization's structure and functioning will be
different in the more-computerized business information system than
in the preexisting one. This co-invention takes time and resources, in-
cluding flashes of inventive brilliance. Inventive brilliance which
changes everyone's job is not usually the most common or the cheapest
resource in organizations. Nor is deep understanding of customer val-
uation of radical changes in "soft" output attributes. Co-invention
takes time and scarce resources, and is the source of very substantial
adjustment costs. IT users designing new business systems are very
aware of co-invention costs, which are one of the central points of dis-
cussion in the professional and business literature of IT users. The
management literature reports that businesspeople think that it is not
the technology which is the bottleneck to creating valuable IT-based
applications, it is co-invention of business logic or organization.'4 To in-
vent any particular new application requires both installing new tech-
nology and co-inventing new business structures. Unless both of these
occur, the application will not function, or will not function effectively
to deliver the desired value. Enabling technologies in general, in the
short run at least, start time-consuming processes of co-invention
rather than trigger immediate returns.142 Bresnahan
The econometric literature has found several results that are consis-
tent with that finding.'5 First, it is the usual interpretation, and likely
the correct one, of the very high measured rate of return to IT invest-
ment and use at the firm level.'6 In a number of studies of large firms,
Erik Brynjolfsson and coauthors have measured that high return. If the
lower-IT firms are the ones thatso far!are not using new IT based
business co-inventions, but instead must overcome them, then that is a
rationalization of the results. Perhaps more directly related to the point
in this paper is the literature on diffusion of new IT technologies across
large firms. Studies such as Saloner and Steinmueller (1995) and
Bresnahan and Saloner (1996) find that business co-invention is a major
barrier to early adoption.'7
In one econometric study, Shane Greenstein and I looked at the tran-
sition, in organizational computing, to new architectures in the late
1980s and early 1990s. This transition was quite marked, and strong
enough to undercut the rents of the preexisting dominant vendor IBM.
The earliest users to switch, however, were not those who had the most
to gain from using the new architectures. Instead, the earliest users to
switch were those who had the smallest adjustment costs at the indi-
vidual user level, often lower-value applications later on. While this
"reverse diffusion" finding may not be general to all cycles of new IT in
organizational and interorganizational computing, the general point is
that obviousness or ease of organizational implementation (low ad just-
ment costs) as well as high value is an important determinant of early
adoption.
In short, the systematic statistical literature largely confirms the
quantitative importance of what the more anecdotal managerial litera-
ture had suggested. The pattern of adjustment costs can be as impor-
tant if not more important in the pace of co-invention and adoption
than the long run value. This characterization applies to the rightmost
three segments in figure 4.1. It is by far the strongest for the primitive
interorganizational applications to the far right. The reason is, these
have very complex organizational co-invention costs; an application
like airline-ticket seller terminals involves changing jobs and organiza-
tional structures not only for the airlines but also for the travel agents.
The same effects are weaker farther to the left, in simpler departmental
applications, for the same reasons, as smaller organizations can be sim-
pler to change.
Here is a particular interplay of technical advance, network exter-
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organizational computing, substantial co-invention costs at the indi-
vidual use level are a bottleneck. Once early adopters of any particu-
lar new technology that is valuable in this area have borne some co-
invention costs, they earn substantial returns on them. Imitation by
laggards follows, with the laggards taking advantage of some of what
has been learned from the early adopters' struggles.
Figure 4.2 shows how these economic forces play out over time. It di-
vides the adoption cycle for an important new enabling technology for
organizational computing into three main phases. In the earliest phase,
the level of information technology is not yet advanced enough to sup-
port the relevant new kinds of applications. That phase ends when
technologists invent major new products or technologies which enable
the new applications. That is, however, the beginning, not the end, of
the economy-wide invention process. The bottleneck now becomes
co-invention. This can take some time, as early adopters struggle to
change products and organizations to take advantage of the new capa-
bilitiestypically half a decade. In this time period, technologists will
be learning whether there is a substantial market for the new products
or technology from the demand behavior of the early adopters.If they
forecast a large market (including late adopters), they will put many re-
sources into incrementally improving the technology in thedirection of
what the users want. At the same time, consnitants, systems integra-
tors, and applications software vendors will be learning from the expe-
rience of the early adopters. All of these advances make things easier in
the third phase. Then later adopters can take advantage of what early
adopters have learned about the business side of these applications.
Sometimes they take advantage of this knowledge directly (computer
people at the early adopters brag to the trade press and then switch
jobs) and sometimes indirectly (systems integrators and consultants
brag that they had a large role in the early success). This "spifi-in" of
knowledge lowers co-invention costs for the later adopters, and they,
taking perhaps another half decade, take advantage of the capabifities
of the new technology.
This description of the adoption and co-invention cycle for "a" tech-
nology supporting organizational computing should not suggest that
they are all alike. Many technologies are fizzles, announced as para-
digm shifts but failing to draw significant co-invention. Technologies
that might be useful in large organizations are at various stages of the
adoption and co-invention cycle at the same time, with some getting





Cumulative adoption with co-invention.
Growth and Welfare EconomicsThis story of co-invention cycles offers
the prospect of social increasing returns to scale. These arise through
two distinct external effects.
The first external effects come from falling co-investment costs. Early
users' experience lowers later users' costs of co-invention. This isa
one-way externality spilling out from early to late adopters, and there
are few available institutions for internalizing it. The one-way nature of
the externality creates an incentive to wait. The resulting spillout, when
the externality is overcome, works to lower the business (not technical)
barriers to future adoption. It is therefore the effective determinant of
the pace of adoption after early uses whenever it remains true, even af-
ter some technical progress, that the barriers to adoption are business
not technical.
The second externality flows through the supply of improved tech-
nology. With foresighted technology vendors, this externality flows
from all adopters to each without regard to adoption dates. The rate of
technological improvement will depend on the total number of adopt-
ers. The more, and the earlier, the adoption, the higher is the incentive
for a technologist to invest, race, or compete for the business. This
tends to lower the technical, not business, barriers to future adoption.Prospects for an Information-Technology-Led Productivity Surge 145
Thus, it will be ineffective under the assumption that the barriers to
adoption are business, not technical.18
Accordingly, for organizational applications the spilloutspill-in
one-way externality is related to lowering the businessbarriers to
adoption and is associated with weak mechanisms for internalization
of the externality while the multilateral externality is related to lower-
ing the technical barriers to adoption, and is associated with strong
mechanisms for internalization. The contrast matters. These assump-
tions about invention and coinvention in organizational computing
vary across technologies.
A productivity surge can follow from a particular technology for
organizational or interorganizational computing. After early adopters'
co-inventions spill out, there will be a number of follow-on co-
inventions. If these are numerous, there will be a productivity surge.
The timing of that surge is determined by the timing of the spillouts,
however, and it tends to lag behind the period of early adoption of the
technology (and the time of the greatest public attention to the technol-
ogy) Historically, these lags have been in the half-decade to decade re-
gion. There is little reason to look for a contemporary relationship
between the introduction of valuable technologies for organizational
computing and the resulting value creation. The productivity surge
will come far later. Indeed, an IT-led productivity surge in organiza-
tional applications is likely to result as a coincidence, with several ear-
lier technologies yielding valuable applications at once. More likely
than a surge is the sustained contribution of a number of waves of tech-
nology through setting off a number of partially overlapping waves of
co-invention.
Adoption Dynamics with Network Effects and Low Co-Invention
Costs
Not all IT creates value as slowly as that. Other segments have far
lower co-invention costs at the individual application level, and far
more important flow network effects. In figure 4.1, these come to the
right. Many technologies which are used by a single person have this
structure. Figure 4.1 shows the PC, but other technologies such as word
processing, the browser, e-mail, or instant messaging have this flavor
as well. Each of these has substantialnetwork effects. If there is a sub-
stantial body of applications, many users will want PCs, and if there
is plenty of online content, many users will want browsers; and those
applications and that content wifi be forthcoming if the technology146 Bresnahan
is widely adopted. As long as there are plenty of others to communi-
cate with, users wifi want e-mail or instant messaging. In that case, the
network externalities are direct (users want to communicate with
one another), while in the case of PCs or browsers, they are indirect
(a large installed base of users wifi draw rich applicationsor rich
content).19
While these uses and technologies have substantial network exter-
nalities, they usually do not have substantial co-invention costs at the
individual level. To be sure, it takes some training to teach an experi-
enced typist to use a PC instead of a typewriter. But those costsare tiny
when compared to those associated with large organizational applica-
tions, which involve both training a large number of users in theuses
of specific software (the cheap part) and redefining their jobs and the
products they deliver (the expensive part). The reason is, adoption of the
individual user technologies has little business co-invention associated
with it. One may put a spreadsheet program ona clerk's computer
without changing her job.2°
The implications of this particular structure of payoffs tousers is fa-
miliar from the literature on network effects. The adoption path shown
in figure 4.3 has three main phases. The first phase is before the inven-
tion of the enabling technology just as in figure 4.2. The second phase
is one of waiting for network effects to take effect, and the third phase
is one of positive feedback once they are taking effect. If an important
motivation for users of a technology is network effects,one should ex-
pect some coordination in the adoption time, as the figure shows. That
coordination can either start quickly or start more slowly, as the length
of the second phase is typically not well determined.
I have drawn the third phase as quite steep, to emphasize the coordi-
nation implicit in the exploitation of network effects. This is mostap-
propriate where individual users already have most of the technology
they need to participate in the network, and it may overstate the speed
of adoption when users need to acquire technology or need to switch
from earlier noncompatible technology Thus, for example,among
users already having Internet connections, instant messaging could be
adopted very rapidly. The PC itself diffused somewhat more slowly,
even though realization of the network effects was rapid, as new users
had to buy a computer to participate in the network effects. What char-
acterizes the markets to the left in figure 4.1 is that they have lowco-
investment costs; they may have other kinds of adjustment costs.
Stifi, the transition from a regime of not realizing network effects to









Cumulative adoption with network effects.
kets. The ongoing momentum of the PC market was assured once it
was realized that the spreadsheet and word processor would be the
dominant personal productivity applications. A series of technical and
marketing activities, culminating in the introduction of the IBM PC,
put the industry in the high equilibrium in which ordinary business-
people, not computer hobbyists, knew of the PC and its main uses.
Once that was accomplished, there was ongoing technical progress
which made PCs more powerful, easier to use, cheaper, and so on. This
technical advance, plus the larger and larger network effects, led to a
steady increase in the number of users, a positive spiral.
The key to the speed of some positive spirals for applications that go
to the left in figure 4.1 is their low co-invention costs. These, in turn,
tend to follow from the comparatively simple and nontransformative
nature of these applications. The precise time constants associated with
figure 4.3 will depend on other adjustment costs, such as the costs of
obtaining technology the costs of switching out of existing technology,
etc.
Complementarities across Multiple Technologies
The last two subsections discussed the adoption and co-invention
cycle of particular technologies. In both the organizational applica-
tions segments and the individual-user segments, this is an oversim-







existing technologies.21 A new positive spiral in a complement tends to
raise the demand for existing technology and thereby further raise
value.
This situation is illustrated in figure 4.4. The figure shows the adop-
tions of the old technology What happens when a positive spiral in a
complementary good begins? Because of complementarity it raises the
demand for the old technology The positive-feedback spiral of the new
renews and deepens the growth dynamic of the old. By this mecha-
nism, even more social increasing returns to scale are created.22
In the PC business, for example, advances in power and ease of use
led to later invention of new applications categories, which sold more
PCs. Similarly, the growing networked nature of PCs (originally moti-
vated to economize on the then highly expensive laser printer and hard
disk drive) permitted the emergence of more and more communica-
tions applications, such as e-mail. These set off their own positive-feed-
back loops, of course, but also cumulatively pushed out the demand
side of the positive-feedback loops for PCs, to which they were
strongly complementary Perhaps the biggest of these complementary
boosts to the PC positive-feedback loop was the commercialization of
the Internet. But the history of the commercial PC has been marked by
a steady stream of these incremental boosts from complements, a trend
which shows no sign of stopping and which continues to push out the
demand for the PC, thereby permitting ongoing exploitation of the
base network externalities. The value of PCs and their complements in
use has grown correspondingly23Prospects for an Information-Technology-Led Productivity Surge 149
Organizational applications can also gain from the introduction of
new complementary technology For example, the commercialization
of the Internet offered many corporations the opportunity to give em-
ployees easier access to human resources (HR) applications such as
benefits through an Intranet. The HR database was preexisting, but
limited in scope as only the experts in HR could access the data. Wide-
spread access to the information is enabled by the new technology and
raises the value and use of the existing databases.
Summary of Variation across Applications Types
Let me summarize this discussion by returning to figure 4.1. As we
move to the right across the four segments, the value of a single adop-
tion rises. So, too, do single-application adjustment costs at the begin-
ning of an adoption cycle for a particular new technology The
adjustment costs likely rise more than proportionately to the value, so
that both are quite large in the most complex applications. Within each
segment that is organizationally complex (that is, all but the PC one), as
we move toward more valuable applications we see the same thing:ad-
justment costs rising more than proportionately to value at the begin-
ning of the adoption cycle. On the other hand, as we move to the right
in the diagram, flow network effects decline in importance as an expla-
nation of the pace of adoption. They decline in importance not because
they go awaythere are still substantial external economies even in
complex applicationsbut because they do not remove the bottlenecks
to adoption. As we move to the right in the diagram, external effects
that flow only from early adopters to late ones rise in importance.
Across all the segments, there are substantial social scale economies
from shared purchased technology And there are substantial social
scale economies from sharing among users. The latter, however, vary in
type and implications for the pace of adoption, as we have seen in this
section.
III.The Current Technical, Co-Invention, and Adoption Situation
The current technical situation, often shorthanded as "the Internet,"
contains at least two distinct applications-enabling pieces of technical
progress. The first is a near-ubiquitous, cheap, and extensible network-
ing architecture: literally the commercialized Internet. It offers the
prospect for new applications in interorganizational computing. These
applications cut across the boundaries of the firm (hence are150 Bresnahan
interorganizational), and include e-commerce, supply chain manage-
ment, customer relationship management, and so on.
A second piece of technical progress is in smarter, smaller, and more
portable computing and communication devicesweb-enabled cell
phones and PDAs, for example, which may well continue the original
tendency of the commercialized Internet to have a universal and easily
recognizable "client," the browser. These enable applications in which
mobile individuals can communicate or get information more easily,
from more locations, promising more convenience and ease of use at
the single-person level.
While both of these technical areas are potentially valuable, they are
associated with two very different trends in applications, which are
likely to be quite distinct in several regards and should not be con-
fused. Interorganizational applications are likely to be highly complex
because of co-invention. Simple adoption of mobile devices by individ-
ual workers is likely to lack co-invention costs but have network ef-
fects. The applications areas are likely to be very different in the
relationship between raw technical advance in IT and the invention
and diffusion of the applications it enables. They are likely to yieldso-
cial increasing returns to scale by very different paths. This leads me to
model the co-invention and diffusion of applications, and thus thear-
rival rate of social returns to innovation, very differently for the two
areas.24
The basic story is simple. I anticipate that interorganizational comput-
ing in the future may be like organizational computing or primitive
interorganizational computing in the past. Critically, such applications
areas as supply chain rationalization, customer relationship manage-
ment, automated procurement, and other electronic automation of
markets, procurement, and marketing are characterized both by very
large value in the long run and by substantial adjustment costs at the
individual application level in the short run.25 Second, convenient com-
puting, by which I mean use of new, smaller devices for the purposes of
an individual worker, may be like PC computing in the past. It may be
characterized far less by adjustment costs at the individual level and
far more by the need to coordinate on moves to new technologies with
substantial flow network effects.26 Thus, the two new areas appear at
the far left (mobile computing) and the far right (interorganizational
computing) of figure 4.1. Of course, both are also likely enhancers of
existing value creation for all the existing kinds of computing technol-
ogy, as in figure 4.4.Prospects for an Information-Technology-Led Productivity Surge 151
Issues Affecting the Pace of Value Creation in Interorganizational
Computing
A number of contemporary technologies have as their main promise
the creation of networked business information systems which cross
the boundary of the firm. These technologieswhich range from ongo-
ing advances in areas like database management systems (nowlinked
to Internet technologies) to new architectures fordivided applications
(such as XML and Java)are numerous, important, powerful, and en-
abling rather than compelling of applications. Further, the new tech-
nologies are complementary to existing ITin PCs, in servers, in
database management systems, in existing data networking technolo-
gies, and so on. Many of the firms which are going to belinked by
interorganizational computing have already used substantial IT in or-
ganizational computing.27
The long-run value of the use of computer and networking technolo-
gies to link organizations and to rationalize organizationalboundaries
is high.28 Much of employment in the rich countries iswhite-collar
work involved in transacting. The new era of networked computing
applications now beginning is likely to lead to very substantial private
and public returns by reducing transactions costs. The distribution sys-
tem's inefficiencies and amenability to data processing show, if not the
exact form of the improvements, the potential forconsiderable im-
provements. "Reducing transactions costs," however, is not a cheap ac-
tivity It is accompanied by very substantial co-investment costs,
especially those associated with changing the roles of different workers
in different firms. These organizational co-invention costs are likely to
loom large in the early stages of interorganizational computing.
It is reasonable to forecast that to reduce transactions costs in the
deeper economic sense wifi involve large co-invention costs.29 These
are the costs of negotiating agreements,specifying the nature of the
goods and services to be exchanged, and specifying (in all but the most
trivial exchanges) a number of contingencies and other contract terms
going forward, and then monitoring and enforcing all the terms of the
exchange, including not only completion of the exchange, but the time-
liness of payment or delivery, the quality of the goods or service, and so
on.3° In many cases, these transactions costs relate to the maintenance
of an implicit or explicit contractual relationship over a period of time.
The level and form of these deep transactions costs are, in large part, a
consequence of asymmetric information. Theprospective value of152 Bresnahan
information technology lies in recording or measuring systems which
are also communication systems, rendering more and more economic
actions and outcomes (1) objective and quantified and (2) known to all
interested parties.
Of course, this opportunity also comes with very considerable ad-
justment costs unless one is prepared to assume that existing trading
institutionsincluding some with extraordinarily complex monitor-
ing, negotiating, relationship, or incentive structuresare understood
by their participants in a very deep and clear way. Without that depth
and clarity recalculating the equilibrium after adding better informa-
tion through IT is difficult. It has been historically quite difficult to
make such calculations within the firm in organizational computing; I
would forecast that it is even more difficult to make them in marketor
interfirm relationship settings. I would further forecast that these cal-
culations will vary across markets and relationships, making theco-
invention costs apply at the level of the particular market or particular
relationshipthat is, at the level of a single new use of IT.
The speed of creation of a large amount of new social value in
interorganizational computing will depend, therefore, primarily on the
removal of the business co-invention bottleneck. To the extent that poli-
cies favor or restrict that economic process, they can speed or slow the
creation of that value.
IV.Policy Issues
This view of the sources of long-run value from IT and of the forces
behind more rapid or slower realization of that long-run value has
a number of policy implications. In this section, I look at the analy-
tical policy implications rather than undertake analysis of specific
policies.
Macroeconomics and Timing
The timing and size of social payoffs to innovations in IT affect a wide
variety of policy areas. Since the greatest value from IT is created
by use of technologies with considerable co-invention requirements,
their timing is where we should focus. In thoseareas, each new IT
technology pushes out the invention-possibility frontier of theecon-
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co-inventiondetermines the pace of value creation. Historically, ma-
jor advances that enable co-invention of highly valuable applications
have set off co-invention waves that take a number of yearsnot
months or multiple decadesto begin, and then a number of years to
complete. Further, new IT technologies build on the basis of existing IT
technologies, so that new enabling technologies tend to open up
more valuable, but also more difficult-to-co-invent, applications oppor-
tunities. This appears to be the right approach to understanding
emerging opportunities in interorganizational computing: there is
valuable technology supporting new applications that cut across
firm boundaries, clear economic opportunity, and the opportunity to
build on existing within-firm systems, but there is also substantial
co-invention to be done. Historical experience would suggest that the
gains from this new technical opportunity will follow with a lag mea-
sured in the half decades.
My view departs radically from several existing views, and it is
worth it to emphasize the distinction. A number of observers assume
much faster creation of value from IT than I do. Observers who attrib-
ute the productivity gains of the late 1990s to Internet technologies or
to the increase in the pace of technical advance in microprocessors we
saw in that time period fall into this camp. The valuethat will be cre-
ated from those advances is far more likely to come more in the new
century than the old, in my view. This applies with particular force to
fundamental enabling technical progress such as faster and cheaper
microprocessors; the combination of faster progress there and a boom-
ing economy in the late 1990s may have arisen because that was a good
time to be in the investment-goods business, rather than because con-
temporary technical progress caused growth with a short lag.
Another view is the hockey-stick theory, in which the returns to in-
vestment in IT remain low for decades and decades, only to turn up
whenfinallyco-invention of valuable applications becomes feasible
or easy. This view has the time constants wrong in the oppositedirec-
tion: too slow. IT is not a single technology, nor is the co-invention and
adoption cycle singular or unitary Instead, each new major advance
in IT permits its own adoption cycle. What we see in the aggregate
figures is the summation of dozens of little hockey sticks. At any given
moment, co-inventors are utilizing valuable inventions that are a half
decade to a decade old in many cases, while struggling to see the impli-
cations of newer technologies.31154 Bresnahan
In short, I would argue that the timing by which IT contributes to
productivity growth in the future will look much like it did in the past,
except that, because of increases in power, ease of use, flexibility, and so
on, the scale and scope of the contribution will be larger. That is an ex-
traordinarily positive intermediate-run aggregate growth forecast, but
not one that suggests a one-time breaka surgein the present or near
future.
The macroeconomic situation in the short run has implications for
the development of IT. Large markets for IT create high returns to in-
ventors, which leads both to more competitive innovation in IT and a
higher pace of invention by vendor firms. Both have considerable
long-run benefits. Growth in the businesses of those who buy IT fora
living (co-inventors) is an important mechanism for aggregate growth
through IT.
Are We Supporting the Right Innovators?
The second set of analytical policy implications comes from the impor-
tance of co-invention in high-value applications areas. As I said earlier,
co-invention is larger, in costs, than invention of IT. Further, it appears
that in the applications areas where co-invention is important, co-
invention and co-invention externalities are the bottleneck to realiza-
tion of large returns.
Externalities form an important part of the argument for public pol-
icy in support of innovation. We argue in favor of government support
of basic science by saying that the returns to that basic science are likely
to be widely shared and hard to appropriate. The same argument typi-
cally militates against supporting applications.
Use of that same principle in the IT area may lead to a somewhat dif-
ferent view of some policy issues. There is a real externalityamong
co-inventors, I have argued, and co-invention is a real innovative activ-
ity. Further, co-invention rather than invention is often the bottleneck
to creation of social value. Yet the tax treatment, just to take one exam-
ple, of co-invention is not nearly so favorable as that of many other in-
ventive activities. This argument does not necessarily suggest that
there should be a new, more favorable tax treatment for software writ-
ten by MIS departments in corporations. It does, however, raise the is-
sue of the disparate treatment of the invention costs borne by sellers
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tion applies tightly to IT co-invention and to precommercial science
which is used in IT, but not to the commercial IT sector itself.
Intellectual Property Policy and Competition Policy
With considerable uncertainty about the ideal applications of new, gen-
eral purpose IT technologies and of the need for co-invention of those
technologies, it is important that supply be responsive to the goals and
needs of demand in IT markets. Competition among a variety of tech-
nologies is an important vehicle for achieving that social goal. Compe-
tition is not the easiest thing to accomplish in IT markets, as both
individual-user adjustment costs and network effects give rise to stra-
tegic opportunities for sellers.32 Individual-user adjustment costs can
become "account control" and network effects become "control of stan-
dards"business management phrases familiar from IBM and Micro-
soft, respectively.
Sometimes, existing dominant firms seek to block widespread distri-
bution of new technologies because consumer choice of those technolo-
gies might weaken their strategic position. This is the heart of
Microsoft's anticompetitive acts in the antitrust case, which showed an
ongoing pattern of that behavior. Competition policy then has a role to
play in ensuring a level playing field. The new technologies which are
competitively inconvenient to existing dominant firms include comple-
ments as well as substitutes. Microsoft, for example, sought to prevent
the widespread distribution of highly popular mass market network-
ing software supplied by other firms that was complementary to its
core product, Windows. That strategic doctrine covers a broad spec-
trum of new technologies. Other dominant firms in IT may well make
similar strategic calculations and seek to block innovative technologies,
suggesting a valuable ongoing pro-innovation role for competition
policy.
Intellectual property (IP) protection policy for IT industries appears
to be strengthening the breadth of original technical inventors' rights
and to be struggling with the definition of co-inventors' rights to busi-
ness inventions. On technical inventions, it seems important to recog-
nize that many new IT inventions are incremental improvements of
older ones, and that many IT inventions are involved in a wide range of
products and technologies. Excessive protection of early invent-
ors appears to be a real danger in the current regime. On business156 Bresnahan
inventions, it is clear that "business process" patents have been very
difficult to set in standard patent categories. Protection has been
granted for inventions which seem to outsiders to be stunningly obvi-
ous, while the general category has no clear guidelines.
It is not clear to me that co-inventors are overprotected in the aggre-
gate, however. For example, enforcement of IP rights by content pro-
viders against peer-to-peer (P2P) networks (surely the most advanced
mechanism for delivery of copying services ever invented) may slow
down their advance. The issue here is that technical change under-
mines existing business models; Napster is bad for Hollywood, as it is
a cheaper distribution system for music. Accordingly, P2P takes on,
through the legal system, some of the adjustment-cost dynamics of
electronic commerce. In particular, it takes on a channel conflict prob-
lem. Cheaper distribution is good for artists, good for listeners, but
changes the allocation of rents in a way that is bad for the existing dis-
tribution system. Until it becomes obvious to artists how to take advan-
tage of the new technology to escape the (substantial) taxation of their
artistic labor imposed by Hollywood, one role of IP enforcement in this
area will be to strengthen the grasp of the dead hand of the past.
With IP both overprotecting some co-invention and making it possi-
ble for existing forces to block other co-invention, we should recall that
IP law is designed to create tradable property rights, and multiple, in-
complete, or confused rights that undercut the clarity of ownership cre-
ate needless transaction cost. Bad IP policy can raise the costs of
innovation.
V.Conclusion
Internet technologies and other advances in IT promise a very large so-
cial return in the long run. That return will be delivered, however, only
after a new round of co-invention of applications. IT does not directly
shift the production-possibility frontier of the economy, but rather
shifts the invention-possibility frontier. Currently available IT, plus
forecastable improvements, enables but does not compel co-invention
which will improve the routines, services, and organizational struc-
tures of white collar bureaucracies for buying and selling. The valuable
IT applications of the late 1990s were not immediately and directly
caused by IT improvements of that era, but resulted from co-invention
that followed earlier ones with a lag. Looking forward, the inventions
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highly valuable, but they are unlikely to arrive quickly, while others
that arrive quickly may lead to less value, as there is no single stock of
"IT capital." The opportunity for policy to influence the rate of arrival
of the valuable applications remains, for the incentives that will deter-
mine the rate of realization of the promise of Internet technologies will
play out over a long period of co-invention.
The key implications arising from co-invention and/or network ef-
fects is the potential for social increasing returnsthe ability to gener-
ate sustained welfare increases through technological innovation.
However, there is no reason to believe that the benefits arising from
co-invention and/or network effects will be realized at anything like
the optimal level without careful attention to the policies and institu-
tions affecting IT vendors and buyers.
Notes
I thank the conference organizers for insightful comments but retain responsibility for all
errors. E-mail: tbres@stanford.edu. Papers:http://www.stanford.edu/ tbres/.
I follow a substantial literature in distinguishing between raw IT invention, which en-
ables valuable applications, and users' co-invention, which creates the applications
themselves. See for example Barras (1990), Bresnahan and Greensteiri (1997), Davenport
and Short (1990), David (1990), Malone and Rockart (1991), Scott Morton (1991), and
Zuboff (1988).
Cf. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) and Helpman and Trajtenberg (1996).
I mean "productivity" in a sense largely unrelated to the productivity statistics we
now read, as most of the gains from IT are unmeasured. More in note 24.
While the discussion in this section is informal, the appendix to the online version of
this paper has a corresponding formal model.
First, it could be the supply behavior of a monopolist selling the new technology. Sec-
ond, it could be the aggregate of several competing suppliers, or the result of a race to be
the supplier of choice. Third, it could result from interactions with sellers of existing tech-
nologies, who might either encourage the new technology or attempt to block its wide-
spread distribution (as Microsoft did with several Internet-related technologies whose
competitive implications it did not like).
See Katz and Shapiro (1994) for definitions.
These remarks draw on Bresnahan (2000), which has definitions and sources. The un-
derlying data behind this particular remark are surveys of expenditures on purchased
technology vs. technology built in-house in the corporate sector. Thus, this part is liter-
ally cost accounting.
I emphasize the cost basis because this does not establish that buyers accomplish
more technical progress than sellers do. Sellers achieve enormous economies of scale
by shipping the same hardware or software design to millions of buyers (this is an158 Bresnahan
important part of the equilibrium that defines the boundary, in invention space, between
buyers and sellers) and thus may be doing "more" technical progress in whatever the ap-
propriate physical units might be.
This result appears both in studies of the demand for IT, such as Bresnahan and
Greenstein (1997) and Ito (1996) and in studies of the firm-level return to IT investments,
such as Brynjolfsson et al. (1996, 1997, 2000). This is less of a literal cost accounting exer-
cise and more an interpretation by these authors of a substantial omitted asset associated
with new IT applications.
To say that one of these is the bottleneck means no more than that the other two are
over the relevant thresholds and that the third is not.
That leaves out engineering or technical computing, which has less co-invention
costs in an adjustment cost sense, and also smaller network effects.
The segment boundaries are not important here; what is important is that more com-
plex applications have a different co-invention process and are supported by distinct IT.
Sometimes major branches of computing are categorized by the kind of computing
used, so that organizational computing was for years called mainframe computing. I
wish, however, to do a categorization by type of use, not technology. The partial replace-
ment of mainframes by smaller computers in many corporate applications is an example.
See sources in note 1 above.
Systematic statistical work on shifts in computing architectures has found substantial
adjustment costs (Ito 1996, Bresnahan and Greenstein 1997), and the case literature on IT
implementation highlights difficultiesin implementing concurrent organizational
changes (e.g. Friedman and Cornford 1989, Hubbard 1998, Zuboff 1988). Moreover, there
is additional evidence that the monetary and nonmonetary costs of these adjustments are
larger than the capital investments in many cases (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996,
Brynjolfsson and Yang 1997, Bresnahan 2000).
Because co-invention costs, and the success of attempts at co-invention, vary across
firms, there is substantial heterogeneity in the use of IT in the cross section of firms at any
given moment. The heterogeneity is driven, in no small degree, by differential success in
co-invention and differential costs of co-invention. Cf. Bresnahan and Greenstein (1997)
or Brynjolfsson, Bresnahan, and Hitt (2000). For modeling purposes in this paper I shall
be more interested in this heterogeneity ex ante than in the uncertainty of co-invention,
which I shall treat as an adjustment cost to the user.
The implicit model in the businessperson's head is near-Leontief, with both knowl-
edge of (raw) technology (at least at some level) and knowledge of the business need or
the organization (at least at some level) both needed to create valuable applications. The
businessperson will report that "technology is the bottleneck" if they understand the
business purpose of a new application and the organizational implications, but cannot
implement it with existing IT. They will report that "technology is not the bottleneck" if
the level of (raw) technology is over the threshold but the level of business understand-
ing is not.
Here I am assuming a brighter line between "business" and "technical" invention
than really holds. The important economic point, however, is that not all of the invention
that goes on in making organizational applications can easily be turned into a GPT. Some
parts of it, and these are systematically the "business" or "organizational" parts, remain
idiosyncratic to individual uses and require use-by-use co-invention.Prospects for an Information-Technology-Led Productivity Surge 159
The sense of network externality used here is unrelated to the proprietary technology
of any one PC, browser, e-mail system, or Instant Messaging system. At this stage, all that
strategic supply is in the background, and we are only concerned with the externalities
among users. Thus, the discussion is consistent with any of the following: a monopoly in
a proprietary technology, competition within an open standard, races to establish a stan-
dard, or standards in competition serving different bodies of demand.
Use of these technologies may very well lead to more and more intelligent applica-
tions, ones that ultimately lead to organizational change and more value, especially
when the use is linked to larger systems. (Think of the clerk having yesterday's sales
database put into her spreadsheet.) That, however, does not hold up diffusion of the indi-
vidual-user technology itself. Indeed, the larger systems have much of the same kinds of
learning-by-using associated with them; the issue is finding something to do with them
at the beginning so that there is some using to base the learning on.
A new technology which is a superior replacement to existing technologies and
which enables new and better applications should be analyzed using the framework of
those two sections.
Not all new IT is complementary for old technologies, so the opposite case of replace-
ment rather than enhancement occurs as well.
Ongoing growth in the demand for PCs has meant in practice that demand for the
two main proprietary technologies underlying the dominant PC platform, the Windows
operating system and Intel architecture microprocessors, has been growing as well. Ac-
cordingly, the tendency of both Microsoft and Intel to use forward-pricing rules to
exploit their monopoly positions, rules which take into account the future demand for
their products associated with the development of new complements, has been richly
rewarded.
I treat increases in the ability of the economy to satisfy human wants with a given
body of resources as the definition of technical progress at the economy-wide level, and
thus label any of a wide variety of phenomena as "improvements in productivity" even if
they do not lead to increases in measured productivity. This leads me also to treat inven-
tion of new applications and other co-invention by users of IT as improvements in pro-
ductivity, though I distinguish them from engineering-sense (or raw) technical progress
embodied in IT itself.
Here a "user" making a single application is a market or a supply chain. The "user" is
coextensive with the economic benefits and costs of a particular application of technol-
ogy, which here is not the firm but the cluster of firms that participate. When I saythat
the adjustment costs at the individual level are large, I mean at the level of an individual
market. When I say that network effects are small, I mean network effects across markets.
Obviously, there are network effects in using compatible technologies for all the partici-
pants in a particular automated market.
This characterization need not apply to all uses of mobile devices, some of which
may serve the purposes of the individual's employer as parts of complex organizational
or interorganizational applications. The characterization applies to the application of the
device by the individual user for her own purposes.
In addition to the business co-invention costs I emphasize, there will be substantial
technical invention and co-invention costs of connecting these "legacy systems."
Cf. Bresnahan and Saloner (1996) and Litan and Rivlin (2001) for analysis of the
long-run prospects. But see Gordon (2000) for a dissenting view.160 Bresnahan
These are transaction costs in the sense of Williamson. Recent treatments of the eco-
nomics of organizations (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) and the economics of market in-
stitutions (Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994) focus on the importance of imperfect in-
formation as a driver of these transaction costs.
See, e.g., Garicano and Kaplan (2000).
Both of these views, the hockey-stick one and the very fast one, arise from asking the
aggregate productivity statistics to do more than they can do. There is considerable real-
ization of gains from IT that is not measured in the productivity statistics, and some that
is so measured, before and during the late 1990s.
Cf. Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999).
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